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I want to welcome all of you, and I am going to start by saying I am 
completely unworthy to say anything about Judge Davies, so far are his 
accomplishments beyond my own.  When I took the federal bench, I knew 
of the men who had proceeded me on that bench, men like Charlie Amidon, 
Charlie Vogel, Ronald Davies, Paul Benson, and Rodney Webb.  And I 
knew that by any analysis, I was completely incapable of filling their shoes.  
Yet, despite that unworthiness, here I am.  I have had the privilege during 
the time I have been a lawyer to know every judge who served on the North 
Dakota District Court since Ronald Davies—and that knowledge demon-
strates one thing:  among a number of very impressive judges, Ronald 
Davies stands out as a giant.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We should get the basics out of the way.  When I was asked to do this, 
I understood I lacked the basic knowledge set to really say anything very 
 
*The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, United States District Court Judge for the District of 
North Dakota. 
1. Hon. Ralph R. Erickson, United States District Judge, Dist. of N.D., 2011 Fargo Davies 
High School Dedication (Aug. 21, 2011).  The body of this commentary was originally presented 
at the dedication ceremony of Fargo Davies High School in Fargo, ND. 
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meaningful about Ronald Davies, the judge, and Ronald Davies, the man.  
So I did some research.  I read every published opinion he authored sitting 
as either a district judge or sitting by designation as a circuit judge.  I talked 
to the people I could find who actually knew Judge Davies and some who 
knew him well.  What I took from talking to those of you who knew him 
was that Judge Davies was short, five feet and a half an inch—and that half 
inch was important to him.  He was reported to have said, “don’t cheat me 
out of that half inch.”  He was serious, he was direct, and he did not suffer 
fools.  That summary of Judge Davies may be accurate, but as I dug a little 
deeper, there seemed to be much more to this man than this short summary. 
Judge Davies was a man of great faith, he was a man of great principle, 
and he was a man who saw the world as it really was.  He understood that 
the world had gray.  But he also understood that some things were black 
and some things were white, that some things were right and some things 
were wrong.  He was a scholar, he was an athlete, and he was a remarkably 
accomplished writer.  His writing style really stands in good comparison to 
judges applying today’s rules of usage in writing.  It is clear to me that he 
was ahead of the curve.  He wrote opinions that were clear, concise, and 
understandable at a time when very few judges actually did that, and I think 
that is an important thing because it shows a straight-forward and 
disciplined mind.  Even in his writing, he did not want to hear himself talk. 
Ronald Davies was a patriot, he was a soldier, and he was the most 
amazing social person one could find.  Judge Davies was president of the 
Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce, he was an exulted ruler of the Elks, he 
was president of the Jaycees, he was commander of the local American 
Legion post, and he was president of the Knights of Columbus at his 
church.  He led not one, but two March of Dimes campaigns.  To me, that is 
almost the most amazing part of his civic commitment.  If a person begs for 
money from his friends and then agrees to do it a second time, it is a mark 
of character. 
Then I looked at the transcript from his investiture, at which he and 
George Register, who was the judge in the Western Divisions of North 
Dakota, were installed on the same day in a joint proceeding.  Judge 
Davies’ remarks appear on one page of the transcript.  If you think about 
how long it takes to talk for one page, it is about three minutes.  I think 
every other person who has been invested into this court has spoken for at 
least thirty minutes.  Yet Judge Davies said all that needed to be said in 
three minutes.  All of that, I think, is part of who Judge Davies was.  He 
was a man of great talent, great wisdom, and great humility. 
My first knowledge of Judge Davies came in an unusual way.  When I 
was a freshman at Jamestown College, one of the jobs assigned to me was 
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to keep the track record book current.  I do not know how many of you are 
aware that many colleges and universities keep a running record of the 
fastest times ever run on their track.  It is not a school record—it is simply a 
record of what the fastest time was that was ever run on the track itself.  
The records are progressive, meaning whenever a new record is established, 
it is simply added to a list so you can go back and see how long records 
were held.  While keeping this book, I noticed that someone named Ronald 
N. Davies held three records that had stood for decades.  He held a track 
record for the 180-yard dash (a race that had not been run for years), a 
record for the 220-yard dash on a straightaway (which they quit running in 
the 1960s), and a record for the 60-yard dash outdoors that had recently 
been broken.  Now, think about this:  he ran on a cinder track with shoes 
that were three times as heavy as anything that had been worn in recent 
memory, and he still ran some very impressive times.  No matter what else 
you might say about Ron Davies, that guy was fast. 
This was my introduction to Ronald N. Davies.  Being amazed, I asked 
the track coach, Rollie Greeno, who in the hell is this guy?  The question 
should tell you something about my own education—I was twenty years old 
and had no idea who he was.  I was told that he is a federal judge in Fargo. 
A couple years later, in 1979, my dad took a job that put him in the 
Federal Building in Fargo.  One day, he asked me if I had heard of a federal 
judge named Ron Davies, whom he described as intelligent, interesting, and 
dapper.  My dad reported that he and Tom Stallman had coffee with Judge 
Davies every Thursday morning at the café in the Federal Building. 
I said I did not know anything about him as a judge, and I told my dad 
about this track thing.  The next Thursday, my dad told Judge Davies, “Hey, 
I understand you were quite a runner.”  The judge asked, “Who told you 
that?”  And my dad told him the story.  Judge Davies’ response was, well, 
“none of that’s all that impressive—they just don’t run those races 
anymore.”  This, too, speaks volumes about Ron Davies.  There was a 
humility about him that is not very common in federal judges.  I can say 
that because I am one. 
II. LITTLE ROCK 
I would like to briefly discuss the timeline of the Little Rock case.  I 
will not say much about the case itself as I think others will do so.  In 1949 
in Little Rock, the law school at the University of Arkansas was 
desegregated.  The libraries were desegregated in 1951.  All told, Little 
Rock seemed an unlikely place to explode as the focal point of the civil 
rights disturbances.  There seemed to be all sorts of other places with a 
longer history of a more bitter relationship between the races. 
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When Brown v. Board of Education2 was decided by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Little Rock School District immediately began working 
on a desegregation plan.  One year to the day after the handing down of 
Brown, the School Board announced a plan for desegregation, so it was in 
1955.  It called for the integration of the high school starting in 1957, with 
the grade schools and elementary schools to follow. 
As a result, the plan was limited integration at first with later 
broadened integration.  Politicians from outside of Arkansas started holding 
rallies in Arkansas to head off the integration of schools in Arkansas.  This 
political agenda was ultimately embraced by Governor Orville Faubus.  
Faubus would later claim his sole purpose was to provide for the safety and 
security of the community.  The sad truth, however, is that Governor 
Faubus was personally responsible for the insecurity of the people that 
arose out of his own vitriolic speeches and the dark evil of segregation that 
was promoted by politicians in a way it had not been seen for at least 
twenty years.  There are people who have written revisionist histories over 
the past decade who claim that either President Eisenhower or Judge Davies 
were responsible for what happened, but the simple truth is that Orville 
Faubus, more than anyone else, was responsible for the unrest.  Those 
people who now claim that Judge Davies was inexperienced in these 
matters and that inexperience caused the incident are plain and simple liars. 
The bottom line is Ronald Norwood Davies was sent to Arkansas to 
clear the case load that had accumulated because of a vacancy on the 
Arkansas District Court bench.  He arrived and did the work that he was 
supposed to do.  He tried a number of cases that were backlogged and 
cleared the calendar.  Four days before he had hoped to be ready to head for 
home, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) filed a suit seeking an injunction.  The NAACP was attempting 
to compel Governor Faubus to relent from his claim that integration was not 
feasible because it was unsafe to integrate the schools.  All judges in the 
Arkansas District Court recused themselves. 
Because Judge Davies was already in Little Rock, he was assigned by 
the chief judge of the circuit court of appeals to hear the case.  Judge Davies 
did what he did every day of his life as a federal judge.  He read what was 
filed, he researched the legal issues presented, he made the decision as his 
conscience guided him and his knowledge of the law directed him, and he 
did not back down.  He did not see this as unusual.  When asked about the 
decision, Judge Davies noted, “there are two hundred federal judges in the 
United States, most all of them would have done the same thing.”  I wish 
 
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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that would be true.  I suspect providence placed the right man in the right 
position to make the right decision.  Judge Davies made that decision coura-
geously, he refused to back down, and the rest is in the history books. 
The Little Rock, Arkansas desegregation case was not closed until 
recently.  It was a long and bitter journey.  But once Judge Davies left Little 
Rock, his work on the case was done.  Through it all, the actions of Judge 
Davies are a beacon to the people of the United States.  His decision stands 
as a tribute to the idea that this is a nation of laws, not men, that all people 
are created equal, and that no person should be deprived of his rights or 
civil liberties on the basis of race, creed, or nation of origin.  We in North 
Dakota are proud of Judge Davies, rightly so.  He is a giant among us. 
The District of North Dakota has produced two such jurists, in my 
opinion.  Judge Charles Amidon struck down The Espionage Act of 1917 as 
unconstitutional as applied to people who protested America’s involvement 
in the First World War.  He was to later recount that people he had known 
his entire life walked across the street for thirty years to avoid having to talk 
to him. 
Ronald Davies also suffered at the hands of his fellow citizens.  He 
would never have, I think, wanted anyone to talk much about the death 
threats or the brutal comments that people made to him.  Even so, what 
these two men did is a reminder to all of us in this business of judging that 
our calling is one that might ask us to sacrifice much.  These two great men 
stand as giants in the history of our court.  They stand as beacons for those 
of us who follow in their footsteps.  I hope that the people that follow me in 
this position will have the same respect for their genius as I have. 
III. IMPORTANT CASES IN JUDGE DAVIES’ CAREER 
I am going to talk very briefly about the cases that Judge Davies said 
were the most important cases of his career.  Judge Davies said that while 
Aaron v. Cooper3 was the most prominent historical case of his career, the 
legal issues were straightforward, he did his duty, and, in the end, justice 
was done.  He said other cases made him more proud because they pre-
sented more complex legal issues, were less clear, and were of lasting sig-
nificance.  I believe those are cases we should spend some time thinking 
about.  Judge Davies identified three of these cases as being of special 
importance. 
 
3. 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957). 
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A. STROMSODT V. PARKE-DAVIS & CO. 
The first case Judge Davies identified was a case called Stromsodt v. 
Parke-Davis & Co.4  This was a case tried to the bench.  It is, I believe, the 
first case and one of certainly many cases in which a court found the 
manufacturer of a vaccine could be liable for damages arising out of the 
unsafe character of that vaccine based on the notion of strict liability.  Prior 
to this ruling, I cannot find a case where anyone had made such a finding.  I 
believe it is the first, but I may be wrong.  The facts are fairly straight-
forward. 
Shane Stromsodt was born on May 24, 1959 in Fargo, North Dakota.5  
When he was three months old, his mother took him to the doctor.6  He was 
given a vaccine called Quadrigen.7  It had diphtheria, pertussis, and the 
polio vaccine combined together.8  There was no apparent incident.9  On 
October 1, 1959, Shane went back for the second of what would eventually 
become three doses of the vaccine.10  When the second dose was given to 
Shane, he suffered signs of anaphylactic shock, including rash, fever, 
vomiting, and seizures.11  Shane’s parents called the doctor.12  The doctor 
said he should be watched carefully, and they should report back if further 
problems develop.13  Shane had two less severe seizures over the next three 
weeks.14  He was eventually taken back to the doctor on November 4, 1959, 
at which time the treating physician concluded Shane should not be given 
the final Quadrigen shot.15 
Thereafter, Shane missed all of his developmental milestones.16  By the 
time he was seven years old, he was diagnosed as suffering from 
irreversible and permanent brain damage.17  Doctors believed it was the 
result of an anaphylactic shock reaction to the vaccines.18 
The question presented in the case was whether Parke-Davis was 
liable.  The trial was heavily contested and, in the end, Judge Davies 
 
4. 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966). 
5. Stromsodt, 257 F. Supp. at 993. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 992. 
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concluded Parke-Davis had breached the following implied warranties:  (1) 
the duty to warn because its studies had shown that what happened to Shane 
was a possibility, and (2) its duty to adequately test and report testing 
results in an appropriate manner.19  In addition, Judge Davies concluded 
Parke-Davis had no defense, under the circumstances presented in the case, 
to claim the vaccine had been approved by the federal government.20  Judge 
Davies awarded $500,000 to the family.21  As far as I can tell, none of these 
holdings had been reached by any court prior to that time.  The body of law 
that we deal with involving bad drug cases continues to operate on these 
same principles.  I believe Judge Davies was the first judge to set these 
principles out and analyze them in an opinion. 
B. MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO. V. UNITED STATES 
The second case Judge Davies identified as significant was the 1967 
case of Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States.22  The basic 
holding of the case is fairly straightforward.  It holds if there is a par-
ticularized threat to a third person that is readily apparent, the United States 
may be held liable to an injured party, who is identifiable, for harm caused 
by an escaped mental patient, if the escape is the result of action by the 
United States.23  The case fell under the Federal Tort Claims Act and 
resulted in a $200,000 judgment against the United States.24  The facts are 
far more interesting than that, though.  Merchants National Bank was the 
representative of the estate of one Eloise Newgard, who was murdered by 
her husband, William Newgard.25  Mr. Newgard was a patient at the United 
States Medical Center at Ford Meade, South Dakota, at the time.  The bank 
sued for negligent supervision and failure to protect and warn Mrs. 
Newgard.26 
On January 17, 1965, Eloise Newgard called Dr. Mack Traynor 
frantically asking for help about her husband, Bill.27  Dr. Traynor went 
immediately to the home where he found Bill glassy-eyed and ranting about 
horses, cattle, and God.28  He observed Mr. Newgard was certainly not 
 
19. Id. at 996. 
20. Id. at 997. 
21. Id. at 998. 
22. 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967). 
23. Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 272 F. Supp. at 418. 
24. Id. at 421. 
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himself.29  Mrs. Newgard reported to Dr. Traynor that she had earlier called 
her pastor, Reverend Faust, and asked him to come over and try and calm 
Mr. Newgard down.30  When Reverend Faust arrived, Bill hid, but even-
tually came downstairs in his boxer shorts, exposed himself to his pastor, 
said he was going to repopulate the world, and threatened to kill his wife 
because she was unfaithful to him.31  Reverend Faust suggested Mr. 
Newgard needed psychiatric help, which is why Dr. Traynor was called.32 
Reverend Faust made arrangements to have Mr. Newgard taken into 
immediate custody.  He was taken to a hospital in Fargo where he was 
examined.33  The psychiatrist reported that Mr. Newgard believed himself 
to be Christ or Christ’s representative on Earth.34  Mr. Newgard was 
committed to the North Dakota State Hospital, and when his condition 
stabilized in March, he was transferred to the veteran’s hospital at Fort 
Meade, South Dakota.35 
While at Fort Meade, Mr. Newgard showed some improvement and 
was treated by Dr. Linnell, who was a relatively young and inexperienced 
psychiatrist.36  On May 25, 1965, Dr. Linnell received a request from Mr. 
Newgard’s father asking that Newgard be released to their farm in Mayville 
on a funeral leave because Mr. Newgard’s uncle had passed away.37  While 
Dr. Linnell approved the leave, Mrs. Newgard reported to Judge Paul 
Paulsen that Mr. Newgard was far from well and that he posed a danger.38  
Judge Paulsen, who was singularly unimpressed by the assurances made by 
Dr. Linnell, issued an order to have the Cass County Sheriff take him back 
to Fort Meade, and he was.39 
On June 30, which was now a month later, Dr. Linnell filed a report 
finding Mr. Newgard had reached maximum hospital benefit and directed 
the hospital psychologist, Dr. Cheney, to prepare a plan of reintegration.40  
Before this event, Dr. Herman, the director of the hospital, conducted his 











38. Id. at 413. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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not to be released, but Dr. Cheney made arrangements for Mr. Newgard to 
be placed in a job.41 
Dr. Linnell, disregarding recommendations regarding Mr. Newgard, 
placed Mr. Newgard at a ranch owned by Mr. Davis in Belle Fourche, 
South Dakota.42  This was the first mentally ill patient who had ever gone to 
work on the ranch.43  While at the ranch, Mr. and Mrs. Davis reported to 
Dr. Cheney that Mr. Newgard seemed awfully nervous and fixated on his 
wife.44  Dr. Cheney went to Dr. Linnell and said he thought Mr. Newgard 
was not well enough to be out and he was dangerous.  Dr. Linnell denied 
such a conversation ever took place.45 
On July 24, 1965, Mr. Newgard travelled to Mayville, North Dakota, 
where his parents’ farm was located with no apparent problems.46  
However, on July 31, Mr. Davis took Mr. Newgard to Belle Fourche to pay 
him.47  Davis took the hired men to town, went to the bank, got the cash, 
paid the men, told them he had some errands to do, and said they would 
meet back some time later in the day.48  Newgard took the cash, obtained an 
automobile somehow (the opinion is not clear), and drove to his mother-in-
law’s house in Detroit Lakes, Minnesota, where his wife Eloise was.49  He 
had tried to run her down with the car when he arrived there late in the 
evening, and when he was unsuccessful in an attempt to drive over her, he 
shot her dead.50 
The case was tried to the bench as a federal tort claim, and two issues 
before the court were:  (1) whether the United States could be held liable 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and, therefore, negligence could lie when 
a mental health patient escapes and harms a third person, and (2) whether 
North Dakota’s damage recovery should apply.51  The government claimed 
South Dakota’s damage recovery should apply, something of no importance 
to us.52  Ultimately, Judge Davies found the evidence supported a finding of 












51. Id. at 417, 419. 
52. Id. at 419. 
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Tort Claims Act authorized the case.53  Judge Davies awarded $200,000 in 
damages.54 
At the time, the case was one of first impression and it established a 
rule that exists today.  The rule applied in courts all across the country holds 
a hospital responsible for an escaped mental patient who causes injury to an 
identifiable victim under circumstances in which they should have known, 
warned, and protected that individual victim, but that the mental health 
provider is not the guarantor to the public at large for injury caused by an 
escaped mental patient.  The case is forty years old and continues to be the 
law of most of the country. 
C. DICK V. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO. 
The final case Judge Davies identified was a case that went to the 
United States Supreme Court, Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co.55  It was 
a case in which the question was whether an incident was suicide or acci-
dental.56  It involved a double indemnity insurance policy.  New York Life 
had paid the primary claim of $7500, but contested the double indemnity.57 
The facts were controverted.  It was undisputed that Mr. Dick kept a 
loaded shotgun in his barn at all times.58  Mr. Dick was found dead in his 
barn having suffered two shotgun wounds:  one to the head, and one to the 
side.59  Essentially, the question was whether a person can be shot with a 
shotgun twice and have it be accidental.  Judge Davies let the case go to the 
jury over the objection of the insurance company, and I think there are some 
pretty good reasons for allowing it if one looks at the facts. 
The shotgun, twenty-six years old, had been relatively poorly main-
tained.60  There was evidence that the shotgun was unreliable and there 
were times when the gun did not fire as well as times the gun accidentally 
discharged.61  Mr. Dick did not always use the gun.62  Often, when he went 
hunting, he would ask his father to borrow his shotgun because Mr. Dick 
felt this particular shotgun was unreliable.63  Other evidence showed the 
sheriff and the coroner took the gun, loaded it, dropped it repeated times, 
 
53. Id. at 417. 
54. Id. at 421. 
55. 359 U.S. 437 (1959). 
56. Dick, 359 U.S. at 437. 
57. Id. at 438. 
58. Id. at 441. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 442. 
61. Id. at 441-42. 
62. Id. at 441. 
63. Id. 
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and were unable to get the gun to discharge.64  The coroner examined the 
body and concluded both wounds were fatal.65  The coroner said the first 
wound was to the side, and it was clearly from an upward trajectory.66  The 
second wound to the head would have been instantly fatal.67  The trajectory 
of the second wound was unknowable, but an argument could be made that 
it was a downward trajectory.68 
The case was tried, and the jury found the plaintiff’s decedent, Mr. 
Dick, did not die from a self-inflicted wound, contrary to the coroner’s 
findings that the death was accidental.69  The case was appealed to the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.70  The court of appeals reviewed the facts, 
finding it defied all logic that someone could have accidentally died in such 
a manner, and concluding the absence of fact to support the claim rendered 
the case such that there was no triable question of fact for the jury.71  
Essentially, the court of appeals determined that the facts were so one-sided 
that the judge should never have allowed the jury to decide the case, and 
they reversed and rendered judgment. 
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.  The Supreme Court 
basically held there were sufficient fact issues to give rise to a jury 
question.72  This ruling reinstated the jury’s verdict. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What do we take from all of this?  Simply put, Judge Davies was a 
pioneer.  He was a scholar of the first order, and his work has stood the test 
of time.  If there had never been the Little Rock case, it still would be fitting 
for the Ronald N. Davies High School to be named after Judge Davies.  The 
Little Rock case elevated Judge Davies into a national figure.  After Little 
Rock, he was a man of importance in our nation’s history, but I think 
sometimes we, as lawyers and judges, focus so much on Aaron v. Cooper 
that we forget the breadth and the quality of his other work.  As someone 
who has read every opinion Judge Davies published, I can say the body of 
that work is impressive.  It is well written; it is scholarly.  There is nothing 
 
64. Id. at 442. 




69. Id. at 442. 
70. See generally New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dick, 252 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1958).  
71. Id. at 47. 
72. Dick, 359 U.S. at 437. 
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in it that is dated to the point where it would be an embarrassment to see 
written today, and that is not true with a lot of people that were writing 
opinions forty and fifty years ago.  Fifty-year-old writing usually looks like 
fifty-year-old writing; Judge Davies’ opinions do not.  It was a real 
privilege for me to go through and read those cases, but for this occasion, I 
never would have had the opportunity. 
My own experiences with Judge Davies are the kind of experiences 
young lawyers have with retired judges.  I had coffee with the Judge and 
my dad a few times.  Judge Davies was very bright, he was very witty, he 
was perfectly dressed, and he was charming.  He was an attractive man—he 
had the ability of drawing you in to him.  He was a person you would just 
want to spend time with.  I think it was a great privilege to have had that 
glimpse because very few people my age got to spend that sort of time with 
him.  I am honored to be here; I am honored to be able to say the Ronald N. 
Davies High School stands as a testament to a truly great judge, but an even 
greater man. 
